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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
THE ILLINoIs BAIL JUMPER'S STATUTE
The Illinois judiciary, to date, has given little consideration to
the potential constitutional challenges to section 115-4.1 of the Illinois Criminal Code, commonly referred to as the Bail Jumper's
Statute.' The statute provides for complete or partial trials in the
1. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1 (1979). P.A. 81-1066 H.B. 0265 [hereinafter referred to as "the statute" or "The Bail Jumper's Statute"]. Absence of
Defendant.
(a) When a defendant after arraignment on an indictment or information charging him with a non-capital felony, fails to appear for trial, at
the request of the State and after the State has affirmatively proven
through substantial evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding
trial, the court may commence trial in the absence of the defendant.
Trial in the defendant's absence shall be by jury unless the defendant
had previously waived trial by jury. The absent defendant must be represented by retained or appointed counsel. The court, at the conclusion of
all the proceedings, may order the clerk of the circuit court to pay counsel such sum as the court deems reasonable, from any bond monies which
were posted by the defendant with the clerk, after the clerk has first
deducted all court costs. If trial had previously commenced in the presence of the defendant and the defendant willfully absents himself for two
successive court days, the court shall proceed to trial. All procedural
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Constitution of the
State of Illinois, statutes of the State of Illinois, and rules of court shall
apply to the proceedings the same as if the defendant were present in
court and had not either forfeited his bail bond or escaped from custody.
The court may set the case for a trial which may be conducted under this
Section despite the failure of the defendant to appear at the hearing at
which the trial date is set. When such trial date is set the clerk shall send
to the defendant, by certified mail at his last known address indicated on
his bond slip, notice of the new date which has been set for trial. Such
notification shall be required when the defendant was not personally present in open court at the time when the case was set for trial.
(b) The absence of a defendant from a trial conducted pursuant to
this Section does not operate as a bar to concluding the trial, to a judgment of conviction resulting therefrom, or to a final disposition of the
trial in favor of the defendant.
(c) Upon a verdict of not guilty, the court shall enter judgment for
the defendant. Upon a verdict of guilty, the court shall set a date for the
hearing of post-trial motions and shall hear such motion in the absence
of the defendant. If post-trial motions are denied, the court shall proceed
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absence of the defendant 2 Although the statute contains numerous
constitutional safeguards s they may not be sufficient to protect
fundamental sixth amendment rights. This article will focus on
complete trials in absentia and examine the statute in light of the
defendant's sixth amendment rights to be present and to have efto conduct a sentencing hearing and to impose a sentence upon the

defendant.
(d) A defendant who is absent for part of the proceedings of trial,
post-trial motions, or sentencing, does not thereby forfeit his right to be
present at all remaining proceedings.
(e) When a defendant who in his absence has been either convicted
or sentenced or both convicted and sentenced appears before the court,
he must be granted a new trial or new sentencing hearing if the defendant can establish that his failure to appear in court was both without
his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. A hearing with
notice to the State's Attorney on the defendant's request for a new trial
or a new sentencing hearing must be held before any such request may
be granted. At any such hearing both the defendant and the State may
present evidence.
() If the court grants only the defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing it shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the
Unified Code of Corrections (Section 1001-1-1 et seq. of Chapter 38). At
any such hearing, both the defendant and the State may offer evidence
of the defendant's conduct during his period of absence from the court.
The court may impose any sentence authorized by the Unified Code of
Corrections and is not in any way limited or restricted by any sentence
previously imposed.
(g) A defendant whose motion under paragraph (e) for a new trial
or new sentencing hearing has been denied may file a notice of appeal
therefrom. Such notice may also include a request for review of the judgment and sentence not vacated by the trial court.
Approved and effective Sept. 26, 1979.
2. A complete trial in the absence of the defendant (hereinafter referred to as
complete trial in absentia) occurs when the defendant posts bail and flees the
jurisdiction following arraignment and prior to the commencement of trial proceedings. In People v. Pace, 34 Ill. App. 3d 440, 444, 339 N.E.2d 785, 789 (1st
Dist. 1975), quoting Hopt v. United States, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884), the court
defined commencement of trial:
For every purpose, therefore, involved in the requirement that the defendant shall be personally present at the trial, where the indictment is for a
felony, the trial commences at least from the time when the work of empaneling a jury begins.
See also United States v. Bell, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
A partial trial in the absence of the accused (hereinafter referred to as partial
trial in absentia) occurs when the defendant is absent from the court for two
successive court days following commencement of trial.
3. See accompanying text to notes 19-26 supra.
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fective assistance of counsel.

Public sentiment prompted the enactment of the Bail
Jumper's Statute." The statute was enacted to prevent the backlog
of trials that developed due to the widespread willful avoidance of
prosecution. Prior to the enactment of the statute, proceedings
were suspended during the defendant's absence. This procedure resulted in the loss of evidence and effective witnesses. In many
cases the victim and witnesses had relocated or were deceased.5
Another concern, addressed by the House of Representatives in debating the merits of the Act, was the increasing number of recidivist offenders.6 The defendant, under common law, could return to
the jurisdiction, commit another offense, post bail and again flee
the jurisdiction. The accused could not be denied bail since he had
not actually been tried for a felony.7 The statute prevents the defendant from being admitted to bail upon his return to the jurisdiction if the court determines his absence was for the purpose of
obstructing justice.
PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE

The predominant purpose of the statute is to prevent the defendant from nullifying an otherwise sound criminal case by absenting himself from the proceedings. Simultaneously, the defendant's offensive conduct is promptly sanctioned. The statute may
also serve to deter bail jumping. Since willful avoidance of prosecution will not prevent the commencement of trial and subsequent
conviction, the accused may decide that his presence at trial will
be more advantageous to his defense. Similarly, since the defendant's flight may indicate guilt, the accused may choose to remain
in the jurisdiction rather than aid the State in gathering relevant
evidence against him.9 Lastly, the statute serves to expedite public
trials.9 To suggest that the statute actually achieves these purposes
4. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 28, 1979, at section 3, p.3, col. 1. The article discusses the purposes and safeguards of the statute and examines problems involved with trial in absentia. The article also points out that Judge Garippo originally proposed the idea for the statute ten years ago. At that time the legal
profession would not entertain the idea, believing it to be "too bizarre."
5. Id.
6. See H.B. 0265, 53rd Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess..
7. Id.
8. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
9. See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972). The
court stated:
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is at best speculative, since sufficient statistics to support the suggestion do not exist.
RATIONALE OF THE STATUTE

The legislature has justified the statute by referring to it as a
mere extension of the initial statute enacted in 1971.10 The initial
statute provided that the trial could be concluded in any criminal
case when a defendant, after his trial commenced, willfully absented himself from court for a period of two successive court days.
The legislature determined that the absence of the defendant
would not act as a bar to concluding the trial. It further provided
that, when apprehended, the defendant would not be admitted to
bail if his absence had been for the purpose of obstructing justice.
The trial court then had the option to vacate the judgment after a
hearing to determine the cause of his absence.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has never determined the
constitutionality of the initial statute,"' the United States Supreme
Court has upheld a similar federal procedure' in Taylor v. United
That a defendant can be convicted of bail jumping if he fails to appear at
trial is not sufficient to vindicate the public interest; the public is entitled to a speedy disposition of the criminal charges absent a finding by
the court that good reasons exist for delay.
10. See note 6 supra. The legislature described the revised Bail Jumper's
Statute as an extension of ILL. Rxv. STAT., ch. 38 § 115-4.1 (1971). P.A. 77-1446,
§ 1 [hereinafter referred to as "the initial statute"]:
In any criminal trial, where a defendant after his trial commences willfully absents himself from court for a period of two successive court days,
the court shall proceed with the trial. The absence of such defendant
shall not operate as a bar to concluding the trial, to a judgment of conviction resulting therefrom, or to a final disposition of the trial in favor
of the defendant. If such trial is based on a felony charge and such defendant is apprehended during the remaining course of the trial, he shall
not be admitted to bail, unless the court finds that his absence was not
for the purpose of obstructing justice or avoiding prosecution. The court
may, after hearing and notice to the States Attorney, vacate any judgment of conviction entered.
Approved and effective Sept. 2, 1971.
11. Challenges to the initial statute have been on the basis of the right to be
present (see People v. Thomas, 37 Ill. App. 3d 55, 347 N.E.2d 264 (3rd Dist.
1976), and the admission of flight as indicative of guilt (see People v. Gregory, 95
Ill. App. 2d 396, 237 N.E.2d 720 (1st Dist. 1968).
12. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 43 provides:
RULE 43. PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
(a) Presence required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including
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States.13 In Taylor, the defendant failed to return for the afternoon session of his trial. Over defense counsel's objections, the trial
court allowed the proceedings to continue in the defendant's absence, pursuant to Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." The defendant was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the defendant maintained that his mere absence could not be
interpreted as a waiver of his right to confront witnesses against
him.15 Despite the defendant's challenges, the Supreme Court up6
held the trial court's finding of an effective waiver.' The federal
rule examined by the Court in Taylor is similar to the initial en7
actment of Section 115-4.1 of the Illinois Criminal Code.1 The
initial statute contains a safeguard that the Federal Rule lacks: a
two day waiting period before trial may conclude in defendant's
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) Continued presence not required. The further progress of the
trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and
the defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be present
whenever a defendant, initially present:
(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced
(whether or not he has been informed by the court of his obligation to
remain during the trial, or
(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will
cause him to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which
is such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom.
(c) Presence not required. A defendant need not be present in the
following situations:
(1) A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes.
(2) In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written
consent of the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence.
(3) At a conference or argument upon a question of law.
(4) At a reduction of sentence under Rule 35.

(As amended April 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975; July 31, 1975, Pub. L. 9464, § 3(35), 89 Stat. 376).

13. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).

14. See note 12 supra for text of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b) allowing for waiver of
right to be present.
15. 414 U.S. at 19.
16. 414 U.S. at 20. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding of an "implied
waiver" since the defendant absconded during trial and should have known that
as a consequence trial would continue in his absence. See accompanying text to
note 68 infra.
17. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1 (1971). See note 10 supra for text of
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absence. Therefore, Taylor strongly implies approval by the Court
of the initial statute.
In 1979, the Illinois legislature extended the provisions of the
initial enactment to permit a trial when a defendant absconds between the time of arraignment and the commencement of trial. If
all the prerequisites in the statute are met, the entire trial may be
held in the absence of the accused. 8
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND CHALLENGES

On its face the statute preserves constitutional safeguards. All
procedural rights guaranteed by the Illinois and United States
Constitutions apply to the proceedings as if the defendant were
present.'" In addition, the defendant must have a jury trial unless
previously waived.2 0 The statute requires a pre-trial warning to the
accused advising him that if he fails to appear at trial he waives his
right to confront witnesses and the trial may proceed in his absence.21 Nonetheless, in order to proceed to trial without the defendant, the State must affirmatively prove, through substantial evidence, that defendant's absence is a willful avoidance of trial. 22 At
trial the defendant must be represented by retained or appointed
counsel.2 Post-trial relief is available to the defendant convicted
in absentia. If he can demonstrate that his failure to appear was
due to circumstances beyond his control,24 he may be granted either a new trial or a new sentencing hearing.25 In any event, the
defendant has the right to appeal.2 6
Facially, the statute embodies due process protections. However, the application of the safeguards presents two major
problems yet to be resolved in Illinois. First, the courts have not
addressed the issue of what constitutes "substantial evidence" of
18. Certain prerequisites must be met before the statute will be applied in a
particular case: (a) the offense must be non-capital; (b) the defendant must be
present at arraignment; (c) the defendant must be sent notice of the trial date at
his last known address; (d) the state must affirmatively prove through substantial
evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38,
§ 115-4.1 (1979). Text provided in note 1 supra.
19. Id. at subsection (a).
20. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(b) (1979).
21. See note 6 supra.
22. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. at subsection (a).
25. Id.
26. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(g) (1979).
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waiver of the right to be present. Second, the courts have not determined whether representation by a court-appointed attorney
under the statute attains the level of effectiveness mandated by
the Supreme Court.2 7 These problems will be examined in the context of due process challenges predicated on the sixth amendment
rights of a defendant to be present at trial and to have effective
assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions.
Right to be Present
The right of an accused to be present at all stages of his trial,
from arraignment to sentencing, derives from the sixth amendment
confrontation clause.2 8 The purposes of the confrontation clause
are twofold: (1) to assure the defendant an opportunity to observe
trial proceedings, and (2) to guarantee the defendant an opportunity to. facilitate his defense and enhance assistance of counsel.29 It
has been held that "[slo long as the defendant is provided with the
opportunity to be present neither purpose is thwarted by a defendant's voluntary exercise of his option to attend."8 0
The right to be present is not absolute but qualified. It may be
dispensed with under a variety of circumstances: disruptive conduct;3 1 when defendant's presence is unnecessary; 2 when substan27. See note 90 and accompanying text infra.
28. U.S. CONST. amend VI provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. (Ratified December 15, 1791).
29. United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1024 (1974). The court stated:
[T]here appear to be two reasons behind the right of presence: (1) assuring nondisruptive defendants the opportunity to observe - and, it is to be
hoped, to understand - all steps of the trial not involving purely legal
matters generally incomprehensible to the layman in order to prevent
the loss of confidence in courts as instruments of justice which secret
trials would engender; (2) protecting the integrity and reliability of the
trial mechanism by guaranteeing the defendant the opportunity to aid in
his defense.
Id. at 1258-59.
30. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)(defendant removed from courtroom after responding to judge's questions with vile and abusive language); People v. Polk, 55 Ill.2d 327, 303 N.E.2d 137 (1973)(defendant disrupted orderly pro-
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tial rights are not affected; 3 during attorney-judge communications involving questions of law;3 4 and by waiver. 8
Waiver of Right to be Present
A waiver is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege."" It has long been held that an accused
may waive his right to be present at trial by voluntarily absenting
himself.37 Although trials in absentia are reluctantly granted, the
courts will allow a trial to proceed to prevent defendants from
treating presence in court as a discretionary matter.3 The defenceeding by walking out of courtroom, refusing to answer questions, and using
profanity); People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956)(defendant
removed from couitroom after profane outbursts directed at witnesses and the
court, and tearing exhibits into shreds).
32. See People v. Saltz, 75 II. App. 3d 477, 393 N.E.2d 1292 (2d Dist.
1979)(defendant's presence would have contributed nothing to presentation of
counsel's motion for mistrial or to examination of jurors); People v. Van Pelt, 18
Ill. App. 3d 1087, 311 N.E.2d 184 (3rd Dist. 1974)(defendant's presence during a
conference on instructions, in which defense motion to dismiss proceedings
against him pursuant to a 120 day rule would not have enhanced his defense).
33. See People v. Woods, 27 Il.2d 393, 189 N.E.2d 293 (1963)(defendant's
substantial rights not affected when counsel made a motion for continuance prior
to commencement of actual trial); People v. Summers, 12 Ill. App. 3d 893, 299
N.E.2d 462 (1st Dist. 1973)(no prejudice resulted from small portion of cross-examination of police officers conducted in absence of defendant).
34. See People v. Lewis, - Ill. App. 3d -, 386 N.E.2d 910 (3rd Dist. 1979)
(defendants were in no way prejudiced by their absence during communications
between judge and jury regarding a legal matter. Defense counsel was present
during each session).
35. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). Defendant was convicted
of homicide after a trial in absentia. The defendant expressly waived his right to
be present. The Court held:
But, where the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody,
the prevailing rule has been that if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has been
done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court free to
proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as if he were
present.
Id. at 455.
36. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
37. 223 U.S. 442.
38. People v. Stubbs, 25 Ill. App. 3d 181, 323 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1974).
Defendant was convicted for possession of a controlled substance after concluding
trial in absentia. The court held, "although this court is loath to proceed with
court hearings in a defendant's absence, we cannot encourage defendants to treat
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dant has a duty to be present at trial when he has been released on
bail and is subject to additional prosecution. 9 To allow a defendant to obstruct the trial process would be to reward him for an
offense.' o
The right to be present may be waived during the trial process.4 The United States Supreme Court, in Diaz v. United
States,2 held the right to be present could be considered as waived
if the defendant absents himself voluntarily after commencement
of trial. Thus, the trial court was not precluded from completing
trial nor did the absence negate what had already transpired. 8
The Fourth Circuit has extended Diaz to apply to a defendant's waiver prior to the commencement of trial. In United
States v.Peterson,44 the court explained that the Diaz holding was
not intended to limit the doctrine of waiver to particular stages of
the trial .' The Peterson court expressly held that waiver could occur prior to the commencement of trial as well as at later stages of
the trial process. 4" Further, the court held that the extension of
waiver principles to the pre-trial stage does not thwart the intertheir court appearances as discretionary." Id. at 186.
39. People v. Steenbergen, 31 11.2d 615, 203 N.E.2d 404 (1964). The Illinois
Supreme Court held: "It is not only defendant's right to be present but it is also
his duty, especially where he has been released on bail." Id. at 406.
40. Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899), appeal dismissed, 180
U.S. 636, 21 S.Ct. 922, 45 L. Ed. 709, cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618, 21 S.Ct. 922, 45
L. Ed. 1030 (1901). The court held:
Neither in criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take
advantage of his own wrong. And yet this would be precisely what it
would do if it permitted ...an absconding from the jurisdiction while at
large on bail, during the pendency of a trial before a jury, to operate as a
shield.
Id. at 460.
41. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) and discussion of Taylor v.
United States, notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
42. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
43. See note 35 supra.
44. 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976).
45. 524 F.2d at 184. The court held:
In speaking of a defendant's voluntary absence after the trial had begun,
the Diaz Court was referring merely to the factual context in which that
particular defendant's voluntary waiver occurred, i.e., after the commencement of trial. Nothing in Diaz should be interpreted as precluding
from continuing with a trial if the defendant voluntarily waives his
presence before the trial commences.
46. Id.
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ests secured by the right to be present.47 In extending Diaz, the
court reasoned that to permit a defendant to avoid prosecution by

flight before trial would be inconsistent with Rule 43 of the Fed-

eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. 8 The rule seeks to prevent a defendant from avoiding completion of his trial by absconding in the
midst of the proceedings.' 9
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Peterson case. 0
Proponents of the Bail Jumper's Statute naturally interpret this
action as an implied affirmation of the Fourth Circuit's extension
of Diaz to encompass waiver of the right to be present prior to the
commencement of trial.
Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly affirmed waiver during
trial and has declined to interfere with court-imposed, implied
waiver based upon a defendant's absence prior to the commence-

ment of trial. In either situation, the validity of the trial is predicated on the trial court's determination of waiver."
Effective Waiver in Illinois

Waiver is a flexible term which must be examined on a case by
case basis.62 The Illinois Supreme Court requires that before effective waiver will be found by the "mere absence of the accused," it
must be evident that such absence is "voluntary and willful.""8
The trial court must examine the circumstances surrounding a
47. Id. at 184.
48. Id.; see note 12 supra for text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
Rule 43.
49. 524 F.2d at 184. In defining the purpose of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Fourth Circuit held:
To permit a defendant, free on bail, to obstruct the course of justice by
absconding without a compelling reason, after having received actual notice of the time and place of trial, is as inconsistent with the purposes of
the rule as to permit a defendant to abscond after the trial has
commenced.
50. See note 44 supra.
51. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
52. See Comment, Criminal Defendant Has an Absolute Right to be Present
at Trial, 23 VAND. L. REV. 431 at 435 (1970).
53. People v. Rife, 18 Ill. App. 3d 602, 608, 310 N.E.2d 179, 184 (4th Dist.
1974), relying on People v. Smith, 6 Ill.2d 414, 129 N.E.2d 164 (1955):
The Supreme Court has made it clear that before a waiver of the right to
be present at a proceeding against him will be found by the mere absence
of the accused, it must be clear that such absence is voluntary and
willful.
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purported waiver of the right to be present since it is a "constitutional question involving fundamental fairness. 5 4 The statute enables a trial court to discharge this duty by requiring affirmative
proof, through substantial evidence, that the accused is willfully
avoiding trial. 55 The Illinois judiciary has not developed a standard
to measure "substantial evidence" indicative of an effective waiver.
However, effective waiver has been based on express actions of the
defendant or testimony of others. It has also been implied by the
court, and has been found to exist when the elements of due process are present. 6
Express conduct by the accused is sufficient to waive the right
to be present. The defendant in Diaz sent a telegram to the judge
requesting the trial to proceed in his absence.57 The Court interpreted the message as a "knowing, intentional waiver" of the defendant's right to be present and concluded the trial in his absence.5 8 In Illinois, express waiver has been found based on the
54. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 310 N.E.2d at 183:
[W]hether the defendant validly waived his right to be present ... is a
constitutional question involving fundamental fairness which, pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 615, should be considered by this court.
55. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979). See note 1 supra for text of
statute.
56. Judge Lumbard, for the Second Circuit in United States v. Tortoro, 464
F.2d 1202, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972), alluded to a fourth standard of effective waiver,
the "extraordinary circumstances standard." Although this standard has not been
implemented by Illinois courts, it may serve as a guideline for future cases involving complete trial in absentia. Judge Lumbard maintained that before a trial can
commence in the absence of the accused, extraordinary circumstances justifying
the procedure must exist, although he failed to define what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances." He conceded that it would be difficult to conceive of
any situation, other than one involving multiple defendants, that would present
circumstances justifying the trial court's election to proceed in the absence of the
accused. Although the trial court has the discretion to proceed in a single count
indictment, Judge Lumbard advised against it absent "extraordinary
circumstances."
Multi-defendant trials indirectly serve to safeguard the absent defendant's
constitutional rights for several reasons. First, much of the evidence overlaps. Second, similar, if not the same, witnesses are called, thereby affording the co-defendants the opportunity to confront them. Third, counsel representing the co-defendants in many cases will represent the absent defendant or in any event, will
indirectly aid the absent defendant's case. Last, the co-defendants are present to
observe the trial process and safeguard the absent defendant's rights inasmuch as
the same interests are involved. Id. at 1210.
57. 223 U.S. at 463.
58. Id.
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evidence and the testimony presented. Notes regarding the defendant's illness have been sufficient to constitute express waiver.5 1
Express waiver also includes testimony presented by relatives of
the defendant,o0 the defense attorney, e1 co-defendants, 2 and police
officers involved in the case" to the effect that the probability of
the accused appearing at trial is unlikely." ' The Illinois Supreme
Court has refused to uphold a finding of express waiver when the
record lacks evidence and testimony to substantiate the fact that a
s5
waiver had occurred.
Implied waiver is "a course of conduct pursued by a defendant
that evidences an intention to waive his rights." ' The defendant is
59. People v. Redding, 43 Ill.
App. 3d 1024, 357 N.E.2d 1227 (1st Dist.
1976)(defendant informed his attorney that he was ill. After judge confirmed illness with defendant's physician, voir dire was completed in absentia); People v.
Colon, 9 Ill. App. 3d 989, 293 N.E.2d 468 (1st Dist. 1973)(selection of jury proceeded after judge received note requesting new court date because of illness);
People v. Meschino, 10 IIl. App. 3d 557, 294 N.E.2d 712 (1st Dist. 1973)(trial concluded in defendant's absence when court found express waiver of right to be
present based on defendant's illness).
60. People v. Partee, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 178, 367 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958 (1978)(defendant's father testified he could not locate
defendant after searching for her at homes of various relatives).
61. People v. Lawson, 52 Ill. App. 3d 343, 367 N.E.2d 560 (4th Dist. 1977)(defendant's attorney could not account for absence); People v. Davis, 69 Ill. App. 3d
548, 388 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist. 1979)(attorney stated defendant's whereabouts was
unknown; court found waiver). Contra, People v. Evans, 21 Ill.2d 403, 172 N.E.2d
799 (1961)(attorney stated defendant may have been confused about trial date.
Illinois Supreme Court reversed conviction stating defendant did not waive his
right to be present).
62. People v. Pace, 34 Ill. App. 3d 440, 442, 339 N.E.2d 785, 780 (1st Dist.
1975)(co-defendant testified that from his conversation with defendant Pace the
previous night he believed that Pace had left and was not going to return. On the
basis of this evidence, the court found both express and implied waiver and con-

cluded trial in absentia).

63. People v. Lawson, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 343, 367 N.E.2d 560, 568 (4th Dist.
1977)(a police officer testified that he was acquainted with defendants, that defendants were not present in the courtroom, and that defendants' whereabouts were
unknown to him); People v. Zielinski, 77 Ill. App. 3d 157, 395 N.E.2d 1020, 1022
(1979)(Cook County Sheriff testified he was unable to locate the defendant).
64. People v. Davis, 69 Ill. App. 3d 548, 388 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist. 1979); People v. Lawson, 52 Ill. App. 3d 343, 367 N.E.2d 560 (4th Dist. 1977).
65. People v. Smith, 6 Ill.2d 414, 129 N.E.2d 164 (1955)(The Illinois Supreme
Court held the trial court record failed to disclose the reason for defendant's absence, thus there was nothing to substantiate waiver had occurred and the conviction was reversed).
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1752 (4th ed. 1968).
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imputed with knowledge of the legal consequences of his conduct
and the court need not find an explicit, knowing, and intentional
waiver. The Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States0 7 found a
waiver by implication when the defendant absconded during the
trial and failed to return. The Court observed:
It seems equally incredible to us as it did to the Court of Appeals,
that a defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of trial
- where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are present and ready
to continue - would not know that as a consequence the trial
could continue in his absence."
Illinois courts have implied waiver during trial in a number of
cases involving a defendant's absence based upon the Taylor rationale.6 9 The courts have yet to imply waiver when the defendant
absconds prior to the commencement of trial."
A problem posed subsequent to implying waiver is whether
the defendant's absence can be admitted as evidence of flight indicative of a consciousness of guilt.71 The admission of evidence of
67. 414 U.S. at 20 (the Supreme Court rejected the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of express waiver and instead implied waiver)(see text accompanying notes
13-16 supra).
68. 414 U.S. at 20.
69. See People v. Steenbergen, 31 Ill.2d 615, 203 N.E.2d 404 (1964)(court
held defendant not only has a right to be present but a duty. Failure to appear
constitutes an implied waiver); People v. Pace, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 445, 339 N.E.2d
at 790 (the defendant knew witnesses had come a long distance to testify and was
present during the major part of the trial proceedings. These circumstances plus
the co-defendant's testimony led the court to imply waiver pursuant to the Taylor
rationale).
70. The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Davis, 39 1l.2d 325, 235 N.E.2d
634, 636 (1968), stated:
We have not, however, been referred to, nor has our research revealed, a
single case in which a reviewing court has sustained the felony conviction
of a defendant whose entire trial occurred in his absence.
The court refused to uphold a finding of implied waiver. This case was distinguished from Steenbergen, note 69 supra, in which the court implied waiver since
the defendant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and defendant was personally present when the trial commenced. Neither of these circumstances existed in Davis. Since the Davis case, no Illinois court has commented
upon complete trial in absentia.
71. See People v. Zielinski, 77 Ill. App. 3d 157, 395 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (1979).
The court distinguished between cases in which the defendant simply exercised
his option not to attend and apprised the court, and the case at bar, in which
defendant's absence could not be explained.
The former situation represents an express waiver. Comments by the State
regarding the defendant's absence would deny the defendant of his right to waive
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flight as indicative of guilt may provide a substantial basis for con72
viction and may therefore lower the quantum of proof required.
The jury may attribute considerable weight to the defendant's absence and thus the presumption of innocence may be eroded. Admission of evidence of flight may also violate the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination. 7 Despite these
problems, the Illinois judiciary admits comments concerning the
defendant's absence subsequent to implying waiver. 7' However, evidence of flight is not allowed by the court when the defendant
75
expressly waives his right to be present.
Effective waiver has also been found when due process requirements have been met. Due process requires the defendant to
be present at indictment and arraignment76 so as to give him adequate notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to respond to the charges. The defendant is advised of his court date
and warned of the consequences should he fail to appear. The record must indicate that the defendant knowingly, willfully, and
without cause failed to appear before trial can commence.77 The
defendant is thereby given adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard, the essential components of due process 7 s before an efpresence and subsequently his right to a fair trial. The defendant in this situation

does not flee to avoid prosecution but simply does not wish to be present. See
People v. Gregory, 95 IMI.App. 2d 396, 237 N.E.2d 720 (lst Dist. 1968).

The latter situation represents an implied waiver. In the absence of any explanation the jury is allowed to presume guilt from the mere absence of the accused. The defendant is assumed to be avoiding prosecution absent an explanation to the contrary.
72. See Comment, Trial in Absentia, 40 TENN. L. REV. 155, 192-93 (1973).
73. Id. at 192, citing Griffin v. California, 38 U.S. 609 (1965): ". . . a comment on absence may be another way of making a forbidden statement on the
defendant's failure to testify."
74. People v. Zielinski, 77 II. App. 3d 157, 395 N.E.2d 1020 (1979); People v.
Gary, 42 Ill. App. 3d 357, 356 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 1976)(the court specifically
held the State's comments concerning flight could be considered by the jury as
one factor in determining the defendant's guilt. Counsel for the defendant was
unable to explain his client's whereabouts. Hence the court implied waiver and
allowed the State to freely comment upon the defendant's absence); People v.
Johnson, 74 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 393 N.E.2d 40 (1st Dist. 1979).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. The Second Circuit adapted waiver to due process standards and defined
the elements quite clearly. 464 F.2d at 1209.
77. Id.
78. "The rationale underlying presence of the defendant emanates from his
right to due process but only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted in his absence." See People v. Medley, 44 Ill. App. 3d 878, 358 N.E.2d
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fective waiver will be found. The Illinois judiciary has required
that due process requirements be met before finding an effective
waiver in the context of the absent defendant during trial.7 9 The
Bail Jumper's Statute incorporates the due process requirements
by assuring that the defendant is apprised of the charges against
him, given the opportunity to respond, and warned of the consequences of his absence"0 before commencing trial.
Determining Effectiveness of Waiver Pursuant to the Statute
The statute requires that the State affirmatively prove,
through substantial evidence, that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial. The courts have little difficulty in determining willful
avoidance through the defendant's express waiver of his right to be
present. It exists prior to the commencement of trial when the defendant apprises the court that he is exercising his option not to
attend." During trial it can be found upon evidence and testimony
presented. s2
Implied waiver, under the statute, although possible for the
court to find during trial in absentia,8 poses evidentiary and constitutional problems. The use of the defendant's absence as evidence of flight indicative of guilt may lower the quantum of proof
for a conviction 4 and may violate the defendant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination." The statute may have abolished the use of implied waiver for a complete trial in absentia
since it requires affirmative proof that the defendant is willfully
s Under the terms of the statute a court may not
avoiding trial."
infer willful avoidance from absence alone since it is not the
equivalent of "substantial evidence."
951, 953 (4th Dist. 1977).
79. See People v. Steenbergen, 31 Ill.2d at 617, 203 N.E.2d at 406 (the defendant in this case knew when trial would resume). See also People v. Stubbs, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 181, 323 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1974)(the defendant knew his motion to
suppress evidence was to be heard four days prior to the date).
80. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979). See note 1 supra. See also
note 6 supra. The legislative history reveals the statute must encompass an adequate warning admonishing the defendant of the consequences for failure to
attend.
81. People v. Gregory, 95 Ill. App. 2d 396, 237 N.E.2d 720 (1st Dist. 1968).
82. See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
83. See note 68 supra.
84. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
86. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979).
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The Bail Jumper's Statute adapts waiver, or the defendant's
willful avoidance of trial, to due process standards. The defendant
under the statute is provided with notice of the charges against
him at indictment, is given the opportunity to respond at arraignment, and is admonished of the consequences of failure to appear
at trial.8 7 It is only after these prerequisites are met that the court
can commence a complete trial in absentia assured that the defendant's failure to appear is an effective waiver.
Right to Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the "accused shall enjoy the right of assistance of counsel for his defense."88 The right to counsel attaches at a critical
state of the trial process.8 9 The amendment has been interpreted
as requiring not merely the appointment of counsel but appointment of "effective" assistance of counsel.90 Without this qualifier,
appointment of counsel could be reduced to a mere procedural formality which fails to preserve the defendant's significant rights.
Effective assistance of counsel is deemed essential as the basis
upon which every other constitutional right is preserved."
87. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 28 supra.
89. The critical stages at which counsel has been held to attach has varied
depending upon the circumstances. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)(the
earliest stage at which the right to counsel has attached is upon arrest. Although a
sixth amendment case facially, Escobedo has subsequently been interpreted as
primarily preserving fifth amendment rights and is severely limited to its facts);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)(preliminary hearing deemed a critical
stage of the prosecution and the right to counsel attaches); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961)(arraignment deemed a critical stage); Brewer v. Williams, 423
U.S. 1031 (1977)(the right to appointment of counsel attaches when judicial proceedings have been initiated; i.e., formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information or arraignment).
90. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held:
[Ilt is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is
not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of 'effective' aid in the preparation and
trial of the case.
Id. at 71. (Emphasis added).
91. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973), quoting
Shaeffer, Federalismand State Criminal Procedure,70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956):
"The effective assistance of counsel is a defendant's most fundamental right for it
affects his ability to assert any other right he may have."
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The Illinois legislature, in enacting section 115-4.1 of the penal
code, has recognized this essential right by making appointment of
counsel mandatory for trial in absentia.2 The statute provides
that the absent defendant must be represented by retained or appointed counsel. Thus, the provision encompasses effective assistance of counsel mandated by the Supreme Court in Powell v.Alabama. 8 However, the question not addressed by the statute is
whether there can be effective assistance of counsel when counsel
and client never meet to discuss the case. The court must appoint
an attorney, most probably a public defender. 9' The attorney, in
effect, would be appointed to zealously defend an empty chair.
Representation is particularly difficult since there would be little
opportunity to develop an adequate defense strategy without conferring with the client. It is difficult to imagine that the mandatory
appointment of counsel compelled by the statute could be
equivalent to effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court has given little indication of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. The Court has used vague
terms such as "competent" and "able"9 8 unaccompanied by clear
definitions. In Chambers v.Maroney,96 the Court suggested that
late appointment of counsel may amount to ineffectiveness if substantial prejudice resulted.9 7 Although the Court refused to "fashion a per se rule of ineffectiveness" for insufficient contact between
attorney and client, its refusal was due to a finding of harmless
error. 8 Aside from this minor guideline the Court has left the interpretation of effectiveness to the good sense and discretion of
trial courts. 9 Therefore, an examination of the standards em92. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979).
93. 287 U.S. 45.
94. See Woltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for
Post Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. L. REV. 289 at 308
(July-August 1964). The comment points out the inadequacy of public defenders
who are paid little, are frequently inexperienced in any branch of trial practice,
let alone the criminal branch, and are overburdened with cases. Trial preparation
is virtually always slighted and rarely can there be any type of informed plea
counseling or thorough investigation in the absence of the defendant.
95. See Comment, Inadequate Assistance of Criminal Trial Counsel: The
Standard for Illinois, 47 CHI. KENT L. REV. 218 (1970). In part, the comment
examines the Supreme Court's definition of "effectiveness."
96. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id. at 54.
99. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
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ployed in Illinois is imperative to determine whether the statute's
mandatory appointment of counsel can attain the level of competence acceptable to the Supreme Court. Among the standards invoked in Illinois are the following: the sham, farce, or mockery
standard; the low calibre standard; and the two-prong standard. 10 0
The standard invoked most frequently by the Illinois judiciary
to determine effectiveness of counsel is the sham, farce, or mockery
standard. 10 1 The standard imposes a heavy burden upon the defendant to establish that his attorney's performance caused a "sham"
trial.102 The standard more appropriately refers to the trial process
itself rather than to the conduct of counsel. Under this standard, a
defendant tried in absentia, in order to be successful on appeal,
100. The concurring opinion in People v. Murphy, 72 I1l.2d 421, 381 N.E.2d
677, 687 (1978), proposed abandoning the farce or mockery standard in favor of a
test requiring assistance meeting the minimum standards of professional competence. This test was adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States
v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and may serve as the future test for
Illinois.
The test, derived from ABA, Project on Standards Relating to the Defense
Function (App. Draft 1971), encompasses three basic duties imposed upon counsel. In summary, the attorney has (1) a duty to confer with his client as promptly
and as often as necessary to elicit all information about matters of defense and to
discuss with his client all potential strategies and tactical choices; (2) a duty to
conduct factual and legal investigations, and; (3) a duty to promptly advise the
client of his rights and to take prompt action to preserve those rights. It would be
virtually impossible for an attorney involved in trial in absentia to comply with
the duties imposed by this standard. The trial, pursuant to the statute, may commence in the absence of the defendant and counsel would be appointed prior to or
at arraignment. Subsequently the defendant could abscond, leaving counsel to represent an empty chair. Counsel has little or no opportunity to consult with his
client to gather information regarding possible defenses. Similarly, investigations
absent client input would be meaningless. Should this standard, endorsed by Justice Clark's concurring opinion, be adopted in Illinois, it would be impossible for
an attorney, in a complete in absentia trial, to comply with the duties set forth in
the District of Columbia standard. Section 115-4.1 of the Illinois Criminal Code
examined in the context of the reasonably competent standard may render assistance of counsel ineffective per se.
101. Under this standard the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that
counsel's performance was so inadequate that it reduced the trial to a sham or
mockery. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 73 Ill.2d 192, 383 N.E.2d 164 (1978)(the
reviewing court held that the trial was reduced to a sham since the defense counsel's arguments were so offensive that substantial prejudice resulted).
102. See generally, Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1077 at 1078 (1973). The commentator points out that the defendant can
rarely meet the heavy burden imposed on him under the mockery standard because it is such a vague standard.
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must allege his trial was "a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice."10 8 The absent defendant can
base his allegation on the following grounds: inadequacy of trial
preparation, failure of counsel to raise existing defenses, lack of
meetings between the accused and his attorney, and failure to adequately investigate facts. ' " The absence of the defendant throughout trial in absentia implicates each of these allegations.
Often utilized in conjunction with the "mockery standard," is
the "low calibre standard."105 The difference between this and the
mockery standard is that the mockery standard focuses on the trial
proceedings while the low calibre standard focuses on the conduct
of the attorney. The low calibre standard is based on the rationale
that since the sixth amendment assures the accused the right to
effective assistance of counsel, 106 performance of a "low calibre"
would violate the mandate of the sixth amendment. A showing of
counsel's "low calibre" performance may include the following
flagrant violations: misapplying the rules of evidence, offering irrelevant and contradictory testimony of witnesses, failing to ascertain
the scope of witnesses' testimony prior to trial, refusing to accept
competent assistance offered by the judge, failing to make objections, inadequately cross-examining witnesses, failing to object to
groundless attacks on the defendant's character, and presenting incoherent closing arguments.1 0 7 The Bail Jumper's Statute may promote low calibre conduct on the part of the attorney absent a client's close scrutiny of his performance. The defendant may be
described as a "watchdog, seeking out improper conduct and serving as a significant member of the defense team."108 With the
"watchdog" absent, the attorney's performance is virtually un103. People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 at 561 (1956).
104. For an excellent discussion of grounds for reversal based on ineffectiveness of counsel, see Finer, note 102 supra.
105. The standard focuses on the totality of counsel's conduct during trial to
determine whether on the whole the conduct was of such low calibre as to amount
to no representation at all or reduced the court proceedings to a farce or sham.
App. 3d 84, 90, 383 N.E.2d 648, 653 (5th Dist.
See People v. Johnson, 86 Ill.
1978).
106. See note 90 supra.
107. See People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 536 (1956)(defendant
was denied effective representation of counsel and thus due process of law as a
result of flagrant violations of defense counsel). See also People v. Redmond, 50
Ill.2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972)(defendant's attorney did not object to groundless attacks on his client's character by the prosecution).
108. 40 TENN. L. REv. at 181-82.
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checked and more likely to decline to a "low calibre" level.
A two-prong standard was proposed in People v. Morris'0 9 to
determine the effectiveness of counsel. Under this standard, the reviewing court must determine: "(1) whether the attorney's performance provided the defendant with effective assistance of counsel using the standard employed in the jurisdiction; and (2)
whether substantial prejudice resulted .

. . ."0 Under

the first

prong of the standard the defendant must establish ineffectiveness
of counsel pursuant to either the low calibre or mockery standard.
As previously discussed herein, the defendant has a strong
probability of success in meeting the first requirement. Under the
second prong of the standard, the defendant has the additional
burden of proving substantial prejudice. The United States Supreme Court has implied that the potential prejudice resulting
from ineffective counsel in trial in absentia is a determinative factor as well as an actual finding of prejudice."' Although the Illinois
Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes substantial
prejudice, 2 the Fourth Circuit has proposed that substantial
prejudice be presumed when there is little time for an attorney to
prepare for trial.'" The defendant on appeal need only demonstrate what tactics might have been pursued by defense counsel." 4
109. 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
110. Id. at 817. The Morris court applied this standard to appointed counsel.
The court was unclear as to whether the standard should be applied to retained
counsel.
111. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1961). See notes 133-34 and
accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of Chewning.
112. See 47 CH. KENT L. REV. at 228-29. The comment discusses the difficulty of proving substantial prejudice. The Illinois courts have not expressly determined what constitutes substantial prejudice. E.g., People v. Clark, 47 Ill. App.
2d 624, 365 N.E.2d 20 (1st Dist. 1977)(the court held the defendant did not show
he was prejudiced without defining what constitutes the quantum of prejudice
required); People v. Thompson, 66 Ill. App. 3d 141, 383 N.E.2d 690 (5th Dist.
1978)(the court stated that to succeed defendant must show he was substantially
prejudiced but failed to afford the defendant any clear guidelines); People v.
Elder, 73 Ill. App. 3d 192, 391 N.E.2d 403 (1st Dist. 1979)(the court stated a claim
of prejudice could not be based on mere conjecture. The only guide the court
offered was to warn the defendant that a review of the competency of counsel
would not include exercise of judgment on trial tactics); People v. Bland, 67 Ill.
App. 3d 716, 384 N.E.2d 1380 (1st Dist. 1979)(the court employed the Morris test
focusing on the totality of circumstances but did not define what circumstances
would constitute substantial prejudice).
113. See Finer, supra, at 1090.
114. Id. at 1091.
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The State would then have to rebut the presumption of prejudice
by showing that even if counsel had more time the defendant had
nothing substantial to offer for trial preparation." 5 A crucial factor
to succeed under the second prong is the lack of time to prepare a
defense." 6 In trial in absentia the attorney's lack of sufficient time
to confer with the defendant and adequately prepare is likely.
Under this standard, appointment of counsel as provided by the
statute may result in prejudice per se. Thus, the defendant may
meet the second prong of the standard and establish ineffectiveness quite successfully unless the State could prove that the defendant had nothing substantial to offer for trial preparation.
An appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, although
not yet raised in conjunction with a trial in absentia, may be quite
successful in Illinois. Under the mockery and low calibre standard,
success on appeal is probable. Normally the mockery standard imposes a heavy burden upon a defendant." 7 However, a defendant
in absentia would have little difficulty substantiating his claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel. Attorney-client communications are the
basis for adequate trial preparation. Since this is lacking throughout the trial in absentia, counsel may be ineffective per se. While
only one flagrant violation of counsel may not be sufficient to persuade the reviewing court to overturn a conviction,"' under the
low calibre standard several violations may be sufficient. There is
also a possibility that counsel may object to trial in absentia based
on an inability to perform adequately, thus allowing the reviewing
court a strong basis for reversal.
Under the Morris two-prong standard, 1 " the defendant is also
likely to succeed on appeal. Since the attorney is often appointed
at arraignment and the defendant may abscond immediately thereafter, lack of sufficient time for attorney-client conference and
preparation may substantially prejudice the defendant. Under the
115. Id.
116. See Finer, supra, at 1092. The commentator points out that the trend to
expedite trials should not outweigh the need to afford counsel sufficient time to
prepare. As an alternative he recommended counsel be appointed at arrest to afford ample time for investigation.
117. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
118. 9 1ll.2d at 531, 138 N.E.2d at 561. The court stated that the totality of
facts must be considered to determine if defendant was denied effective assistance
of counsel. Certain conduct which may be shocking in one case may not be in
another.
119. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
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Fourth Circuit standard, counsel would be presumed ineffective
unless the State could demonstrate that added time would not
have facilitated trial preparation.12 0
Waiver of Right to Counsel
Like other fundamental rights, the right to the assistance of
counsel may be waived if it complies with the Johnson v. Zerbst
standard. 2 ' The legislature, however, did not contemplate waiver
of counsel when enacting the Bail Jumper's Statute. This is apparent for two basic reasons. First, the statute imposed a limitation on
trial in absentia by mandating representation by counsel."" Second, although the defendant is apprised of the consequences regarding forfeiture of the right to be present at trial, he is not
warned of the consequences of forfeiture of counsel. 2 s Since an apprisal of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences is a
2 purprerequisite to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver"'
2
suant to Johnson,' the defendant cannot validly waive his right
to counsel absent such a warning. In effect the statute compels assistance of counsel for the absent defendant which may pose an
additional problem.
The Supreme Court in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann'26 expressly held that the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel also embodies a correlative right to self-representation. 12 7 The Court stated that as long as the defendant knowingly
120. See accompanying text to note 115 supra.
121. 304 U.S. at 464. The Court held, "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
122. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979). See note 1 supra.
123. See note 6 supra. The legislative history reveals the statute must encompass a warning regarding consequences of waiving the right to be present; i.e.,
the forfeiture of the right to confront witnesses. The history does not mandate a
warning to the effect that the defendant will lose his right to be represented by
counsel if he fails to appear.
124. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). The Court held that to be
valid the waiver of counsel must be made with knowledge of the charges, punishments, defenses, mitigating circumstances, and other relevant matters. Id. at 724.
125. 304 U.S. at 464.
126. 317 U.S. 269 (1942)(defendant was indicted for defrauding the mails and
insisted upon representing himself at trial. Upon appeal the Court determined
that the trial was not void because of defendant's option for self-representation.
The Constitution, the Court held, does not deem an accused incompetent merely
because he lacks the advice of counsel). Id. at 277.
127. Id. at 279.

[1981:303)

ILLINOIS BAIL JUMPER'S STATUTE

waives his right to counsel the Constitution does not compel him
to have assistance.' 2 ' In Faretta v. California'"the Court held
that "a state may not compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he
does not want."1 0 The Bail Jumper's Statute may be coercing a
defendant to comply with that which has been expressly forbidden
by the Supreme Court. In light of these Supreme Court decisions,
the statute may be violative of the sixth amendment in that it
forecloses the absent defendant from exercising his correlative
right of self-representation upon return to the jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the defendants in Adams and Faretta are
clearly distinguishable from the absent defendant. In both cases
the defendants were present in order to take advantage of their
option to represent themselves' and were apprised of the dangers
and the disadvantages of doing so."3 Thus, their waiver of assistance was knowingly made. The absent defendant is not apprised
of the consequences of waiver of counsel. Nor is he apprised of the
option to represent himself and accompanying consequences of
choosing this option. Unlike the defendants in Adams and Faretta,
the absent defendant's waiver of both rights does not comply with
the Johnson standard. The Adams and Farettaholdings may be
limited to situations involving the defendant who is present at trial
and thus the Illinois legislature may permissibly compel assistance
in trial in absentia. The Supreme Court in Chewning v. Cunningham"8 held in the context of examining a recidivist statute, that
128. Id.
129. 422 U.S. 806 (1975)(defendant was indicted for grand theft. Despite his
insistence upon self-representation the trial court appointed a public defender to
represent him claiming he had no constitutional right to present his own defense.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case holding that
the defendant has a correlative right of self-representation under the sixth
amendment and the State may not compel a defendant to accept appointment of
counsel). Id. at 834.
130. Id. at 833. The Court stated:
An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous
and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him
by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.
Id. at 821.

131. 317 U.S. 269; 422 U.S. 806.

132. Id.
133. 368 U.S. 443 (1961)(the defendant was convicted under a recidivist statute and brought a habeas corpus proceeding to challenge the legality of the additional sentence imposed since he was denied the assistance of counseL The Court
stated the complexity of the case warranted appointment of counsel). Id. at 447.
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the seriousness of the charge, the complexity of the issues, and the
high probability of resulting prejudice from the absence of counsel
were factors in determining whether the statute violated the due
process clause."8 The Court's statement appears to be particularly
applicable to trial in absentia. In addition, if the trial court is allowed to terminate self-representation by a disruptive defendant '
' it is likely the opor appoint standby counsel when necessary, 86
tion of self-representation in trial in absentia can be foreclosed.
Therefore, in addition to the contentions based on ineffectiveness of counsel,' 87 the absent defendant may attempt to challenge
the statute's mandatory appointment of counsel provision on appeal. Based on the Supreme Court's determination that the State
cannot compel appointment of counsel,' 88 the defendant on appeal
may contend he was foreclosed of the option of self-representation
in the original trial. If trial were delayed until his return, the option would have been available to him. By foreclosing this option
his sixth amendment correlative right of self-representation may
have been violated.
JUDICIL

INTERPRETATION OF ILLINOIS' STATUTE

To date the Illinois judiciary has ostensibly examined the statute in four cases.' 8 ' In People v. Partee40 the appellate court examined the statute in an unusual context. The defendant fled during trial for armed robbery. The court, in lieu of concluding trial,
declared a mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict.' 4 z
The defendant appealed, alleging the trial court improperly declared a mistrial since the application of the statute was
mandatory.'
Relying on the former statute, the defendant
claimed the trial court should have adjourned for two successive
134. Id.
135. 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46.
136. 422 U.S. at 835 n. 46.
137. See notes 104, 107, 114 and accompanying text supra.
138. 422 U.S. 806.
139. Although claiming to interpret the revised statute, the courts have resorted to the provisions of the initial statute since in each of the cases the defendant absconded during trial. Nevertheless, an examination of the cases may shed
some light on the constitutional problems likely to arise under the revised statute.
140. 52 Ill. App. 3d 178, 367 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist. 1979), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 958, 98 S. Ct. 3074, 57 L. Ed.2d 1124 (1977).
141. Id. at 179, 367 N.E.2d at 189 (jury notes were received by the court
regarding the hopelessness of reaching a verdict).
142. 52 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 367 N.E.2d at 190.
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court days and thereafter continued trial in her absence.143 The
court of appeals did not determine whether the application of the
statute was a mandatory procedure. Instead, the court remanded
for a new trial based on the trial court's finding that the jury was
hopelessly deadlocked and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declaring a mistrial."' Although the court did not determine whether the application of the statute is mandatory, the
5
legislature seems to suggest that it is not."
The statute was examined in the context of post-conviction relief in People v. Davis."" The defendant and his co-conspirator
were indicted for armed robbery. The defendant waived his right
to jury trial and absented himself from voir dire with the consent
of the court. Thereafter the defendant willfully absented himself
for a period of eighteen months." 7 The trial concluded, in absentia, with a conviction for armed robbery. On appeal, the defendant
first contended the trial could not conclude pursuant to the statute
since trial had not commenced." The appellate court found that
trial had commenced pursuant to the statute since defendant was
present on the designated court date, executed a written jury
waiver and was present to hear the indictment against him."'
The defendant next contended that conducting the trial in his
absence deprived him of his constitutional right to be present at all
stages of his trial.8 0 Although the court recognized the general rule
that trials in absentia are not favored, "' it relied on the exception
rule.

143.

ILL. REv. STAT.,

ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979). See note 1 supra for text of

144. 52 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 367 N.E.2d at 191.
145. See note 6 supra. The general assembly debates state defendant "could"
be tried in his absence. "Could" implies a discretionary application of the statute
by the court.
146. 69 Ill. App. 3d 548, 388 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist. 1979).
147. Defendant's co-conspirator requested a jury trial and the trial court de-

cided to conduct both hearings simultaneously. Id. at 549, 388 N.E.2d at 168.

148. 69 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 388 N.E.2d at 169. Defendant claimed trial had
not commenced since witnesses were not sworn in nor was evidence presented.
See note 2 supra.
149. The court determined trial had commenced and concluded trial in the

defendant's absence pursuant to the initial statute incorporated within the provisions of the revised statute. The court's decision was an attempt to bring the
factual circumstances within the Taylor rationale. See notes 67, 68 and accompanying text supra.
150. 69 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 388 N.E.2d at 169.
151. Id., quoting People v. Summers, 12 Ill. App. 3d 893, 299 N.E.2d 462 (1st
Dist. 1973):
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to the rule: a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to be present necessitates trial in absentia.15 2 Furthermore, the statute
warns that the absence of the defendant shall not operate as a bar
to concluding trial.1 18 The state had affirmatively proven through
substantial evidence that the defendant was willfully avoiding
trial.1 54 The state met both this burden and their burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no indication
that the quantum of proof had been lowered or substituted with
evidence of defendant's absence to establish guilt.-5
The statute was further examined in People v. Johnson.'
The defendant and his co-defendant were convicted of armed robbery. On appeal, the defendant maintained, among other contentions, that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for mistrial when his co-defendant did not appear after the first day of
trial.1 7 Defendant contended that his co-defendant's flight as an
indication of guilt implicated him and denied him a fair trial.15 '
The appellate court held it was proper to proceed pursuant to section 115-4.1 since both defendants were jointly indicted and the
simultaneous hearing would not violate defendant's right to a fair
trial absent antagonistic defenses.'"9 The appellate court found
that the jury was adequately instructed to regard each defendant
separately. Hence, the absence of one did not affect a determination of guilt or innocence of the other.16' The conviction was upheld since the prejudice alleged by the defendant was speculative
in view of the eyewitnesses and testimony presented."'
A criminal trial of a defendant conducted in his absence is not favored

by the courts and a trial court should be loath to permit a trial to pro-

ceed in a defendant's absence, even where the trial has commenced.
152. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
153. ILL. Rnv. STAT., ch. 38 § 115-4.1(b) (1979). See note 1 supra for text of

statute.

154. 69 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 388 N.E.2d at 168-69 (police officers and defen-

dant's counsel were unable to locate the defendant; hence the defendant's bond

was forfeited and a warrant issued for his arrest).
155. Id. (two police officers testified that defendant was apprehended leaving
an apartment that had just been robbed; stolen items were found on defendant's

person; one of the victims identified the defendant).
156. 74 111. App. 3d 1037, 393 N.E.2d 40 (1979).
157. Id. at 1044, 393 N.E.2d at 45.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.

161. 74 Ill. App. 3d 1044-45, 393 N.E.2d 43-44 (victim identified defendant in
a lineup; police officers apprehended defendants in a stolen vehicle after a chase).
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The most recent examination of the statute by the judiciary
occurred in People v. Zielinski.' The defendant absconded during
his trial on an indictment for armed robbery and battery. After a
partial trial in absentia the defendant was convicted. On appeal,
the defendant maintained that he was denied a fair trial because
the trial court permitted the State to argue that defendant's flight
during trial was indicative of a consciousness of guilt.' The court
disposed of this contention by referring to People v. Gary'64 which
held that reference to the absence of the defendant could be considered by the jury as "some" evidence of his guilt." 5 In addition,
defendant's counsel was unable to explain defendant's absence.
Therefore, the defendant fell within that category of cases where
evidence of flight is properly admitted as indicative of guilt."" It
did not appear the defendant's absence weighed heavily in the
jury's determination of guilt.1' 7 The conviction in this case was
based on eyewitnesses, and guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The foregoing cases have indicated some basic predictions for
appellate review of complete trials in absentia. First, the application of the statute is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial judge.'" Unless an abuse of discretion is found, the reviewing
court will uphold the trial court's decision. Second, the state must
prove through substantial evidence the defendant willfully avoided
prosecution before trial is likely to commence in absentia.'69 The
reviewing court will examine the evidence on appeal and may overturn a conviction if the record is not substantiated. Third, evidence of a defendant or co-defendant's flight can be considered by
the jury in determining guilt.1 70 The reviewing court will examine
162. 77 Ill. App. 3d 157, 395 N.E.2d 1020 (1st Dist. 1979).
163. Id. at 161-62, 395 N.E.2d at 1021.
164. 42 Ill. App. 3d 357, 356 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 1976). The court held that
evidence of flight after indictment and before trial could be considered as one
factor in determining defendant's guilt.
165. Id.
166. 77 111. App. 3d at 161, 395 N.E.2d at 1023. See also notes 71-74 and
accompanying text supra.
167. Id., 395 N.E.2d at 1023. The defendant was in the process of committing
a felony when he was apprehended by police.
168. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
169. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 115-4.1(a) (1979). See note 1 supra for text of
statute.
170. See People v. Johnson, 74 I1. App. 3d 1037, 393 N.E.2d 40 (1st Dist.
1979).
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the record to determine if proper instructions had been given to
the jury in a multiple defendant situation. The trial court instructions must advise the jury to consider each defendant separately in
order to be deemed adequate by the reviewing court.17
The cases have not given any indication of how the reviewing
court will respond to a challenge based on ineffectiveness of counsel. As previously discussed, the probability of success based on
this challenge is quite high. Nor have the cases given any indication of the standard to be adopted to determine waiver in complete
trial in absentia. The statutory provisions appear to comply with
7

the due process requirements.'1

ALTERNATIVES TO COMPLETE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA

One viable solution to the loss of basic constitutional rights
resulting from complete trial in absentia is the use of pre-recorded
videotapes.' 78 Basically the testimony and evidence would be prerecorded out-of-court for subsequent in-court presentations in the
presence of the defendant.1 74 This would essentially alleviate the
pre-statutory problems of misplaced evidence and lack of effective
witnesses due to relocation or death. Thus, criminal cases under
this alternative would not deteriorate but would be preserved for a
future date. The witnesses, of course, must be unavailable if and
when the defendant returns to the jurisdiction before the videotaped proceeding would be admitted into evidence.17 The constitutional ramifications of trial in absentia would be alleviated since
the defendant would be present in court to observe the proceedings
and question trial tactics chosen by his attorney. Problems regarding effective assistance of counsel would also be lessened. The defense attorney would have ample opportunity to consult with his
client and offer additional evidence and defenses. Although the
problems with this alternative are numerous, 7 the advantages
171. Id.
172. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.

173. See generally, McCrystal, The Promise of Pre-recorded Videotaped
Trials, 63 A.B.A.J. 977-79 (July 1977), for an excellent discussion of the advan-

tages of taped trials. See also Comment, The Confrontation Clause, Short Circuited, 44 UMKC L. Rav. 517-25 (Spring 1976). Videotapes have been implemented in civil as well as criminal trials with effective results.
174. Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings, A Technological Obsession, 61

A.B.A.J. 956 (August 1975).
175. 44 UMKC L. REv. at 519 (1976).
176. Id. at 521-25. Disadvantages:
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simultaneously preservhave proven economically beneficial while
177
ing the integrity of the trial process.
In lieu of a complete alternative to trial in absentia, the Illinois judiciary should recognize that not every case involving a defendant's voluntary absence is a proper one in which to commence
trial.1 7 The trial court should balance the _public interest in protecting the absent defendant's constitutional rights against the
purposes the statute was designed to promote.17 ' The court should
only commence trial in absentia if extraordinary circumstances"
exist. The following factors should be considered in making this
determination: judicial economy, expediency of criminal trials, the
likelihood the trial could soon take place in the presence of the
(1) there is a more relaxed atmosphere and this may cause the witness to be
less mindful of the importance of his testimony;
(2) there is virtually nothing to remind the witness he is testifying under
oath;
(3) the pressure an attorney places upon a witness during cross-examination
is significantly diminished;
(4) the trier of fact sees the witness in a relaxed surrounding. The witness
will not have the same psychological compulsion toward testifying accurately on
tape as he would in open court;
(5) since videotaping is done in the absence of the judge, his role will be
reduced from that of active participant to reviewer of isolated pdrtions;
(6) the content of what the jury sees will be affected by the process of
recording;
(7) jury concentration in viewing proceedings on screen may pose
difficulties;
(8) translation from live trial to taped trials may lose subtle nuances or
other non-verbal subliminal elements of communication;
(9) videotaped trials will merely shift the cost and workload from courts to
other avenues and individuals.
177. Murray, Use of Videotapes in the Preparationand Trial of Lawsuits,
11 FORUM 1152-59 at 1153-54 (1976). The following are some of the advantages of
pre-recorded videotaped trials:
(1) preserving witnesses' testimony and demeanor;
(2) problems of delay are greatly alleviated;
(3) the rise of last-minute trial postponements due to witness unavailability
are eliminated;
(4) overall trial preparation is possible;
(5) prejudicial matters can be eliminated from trial;
(6) good quality recordings often result in better jury receptm, eliminating
distractions and extraneous interference.
178. See note 56 supra.
179. For an excellent discussion of the public interest in requiring defendant's presence, see 40 TENN. L. R.v. at 176-82 (1973).
180. See note 56 supra.
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accused, the sufficiency of testimony regarding the defendant's voluntary absence, the adequacy of pre-trial warnings, the probable
effectiveness of attorney performance, and compliance with due
process requirements.181 The balance affords a safeguard, in addition to those provided by the statute, to assure the defendant's
constitutional rights are not eradicated without promoting significant public interests.
CONCLUSION

The Bail Jumper's Statute purports to attain several valid
purposes: preventing deterioration of criminal trials, providing a
deterrent to bail jumping, serving to expedite trials and promptly
sanctioning offensive conduct.18' Although the statute is replete
with constitutional safeguards,1 88 trial in absentia poses four basic
problems: the determination of substantial evidence required to establish a knowing intentional effective waiver, the danger of a
lower quantum of proof from the admisson of evidence of flight,
the determination of effectiveness of counsel provided in a complete trial in absentia, and the constitutionality of mandatory appointment of counsel.
In Illinois, effective waiver has been based on the express actions of the defendant, has been implied by the court, and has
been found to exist when the elements of due process are present.
The statute may have rejected implied waiver since the State must
affirmatively prove the defendant's absence, thus eliminating the
inference of waiver.'8 4 The statute adapts waiver to due process
standards since it assures the defendant is apprised of the charges
against him, is provided with the opportunity to respond and is
admonished of the consequences of his failure to appear. 18 The
181. 462 F.2d at 1210. The Second Circuit proposed the following factors to
determine if trial should commence in absentia:
The likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant
present, the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly on multiple defendant
trials, the burden on the government of having to undertake two trials,
again particularly in multiple defendant trials where the evidence against
the defendant is often overlapping and more than one trial might keep
the government's witnesses in substantial jeopardy.

Id.

182.
183.
184.
185.

See
See
See
See

accompanying text to notes 8-9 supra.
notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra.
note 86 and accompanying text supra.
note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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court should be hesitant to find waiver and should do so only
under extraordinary circumstances,186 balancing the public interest
in protecting a defendant's constitutional rights against the pur187
poses which the statute was designed to promote.
The judiciary must make certain that the quantum of proof
required to obtain a conviction is not lowered as a result of the
admission of evidence of the defendant's flight."' The Illinois
courts have allowed evidence of flight to be considered by the jury
as a factor in determining guilt after implying waiver. The trial
court should seriously consider whether the State should be allowed to comment upon the defendant's absence since it is a type
of self-incrimination prohibited by the fifth amendment.'" In addition, this type of evidence may form a substantial basis for conviction, thereby lowering the quantum of proof required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 90 Comments regarding
absence seem appropriate only when the matter of the defendant's
identification is in issue,"91 or when the State wishes to apprise the
jury that the absence of the defendant is not based upon coercion
on its part.19 2 The reviewing court should examine the record to
determine whether comments regarding flight were based on the
foregoing grounds. The court should also determine whether guilt
was established beyond a reasonable doubt based on all the evidence rather than on the mere absence of the defendant.
A third problem, and perhaps one lacking any type of constitutional safeguard, is the inevitable ineffectiveness of counsel in
complete trial in absentia. Under the mockery, the low calibre and
the two-prong standards in Illinois, counsel for an absent defendant may be ineffective per se.9'" To help alleviate this problem
the trial judge may have to become an overseer of attorney performance, strictly scrutinizing every trial tactic and offering necessary advice to safeguard the absent defendant's constitutional
rights. This may hinder the objectivity of the judge. In any event,
it is difficult to envisage that the in absentia proceeding can attain
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See note 56 supra.
Id.
See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
191. 40 TENN. L. REV. at 192-93.
192. Id.
193. See text accompanying notes 104, 107, 114-16 supra.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the level Pf effectiveness mandated by the Supreme Court. 9 "
Lastly, the statute may be contrary to recent Supreme Court
cases that prohibit a state from mandatorily appointing counsel. 195
The absent defendant's option for self-representation, incorporated within the provisions of the sixth amendment, may be violated under the statute. The statute should mandate a warning be
given to the defendant apprising him of this option as well as the
consequences of waiving the option. The record should clearly indicate a warning was given and the defendant knowingly waived his
right to set( 7 epresentation.
The st4We is a hasty remedial measure by the legislature in
response to p0 desire to expedite criminal trials. It fails to adequately preserve the defendant's constitutional rights. The legislature should- re-evaluate the Bail Jumper's Statute in light of the
alternative of pre-recorded videotapes.'" In the interim the judiciary should remember two basic principles. First, the cumulative effect of forfeiting several basic constitutional rights may turn the
trial into a mere procedural formality rather than a process vested
with integrity and reliability. 19 Second, the decision to commence
trial in absentia is discretionary, not mandatory.1" The court
should only commence trial in the defendant's absence if the factors supporting the purpose of the statute clearly outweigh the loss
of defendants constitutional rights, keeping in mind that
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected wthout judicial recognition of the paramount need for
prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures.'
SHARON SANTILLI BROCCOLI
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195.
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197.
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note 90 and accompanying text supra.
notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
McCrystal, note 173 supra.
note 29 supra.

198. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
199. 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).

